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The New Historians of Israel and
their Political Involvement
Ilan Greilsammer
1 As you know, of course, Zionism is a very original political movement, compared with
other national projects of the nineteenth century. The idea, as developed by Hovevei Zion,
the “Zion Lovers” in the 1880’s, then by Theodor Herzl in his book Der Judenstadt, and in
his presentation at the first Zionist Congress in Basel, aimed at establishing a nation-state
for the Jewish People in Palestine (or “Eretz Israel”).
2 But contrary to other national minorities in Europe, what is called “the Jewish People”
was, after the Emancipation, extremely heterogeneous, and divided by many cleavages,
between  religious  and  non-religious,  sefardim  and  ashkenazim,  socialists  and  anti-
socialists, bourgeoisie and workers, etc… It was very far from constituting “one people”,
and the founders of the Zionist movement should have had… a lot of imagination when
they thought that so many different groups of populations could be united one day into a
single nation. 
3 The man, the leader, the thinker who, more than any other, considered as his personal
task to fuse and mix all these populations in the Land of Israel, was David Ben-Gurion, the
head of the Zionist movement and the Jewish Agency, the founder of the Mapai party in
1930, the initiator of the State of Israel in 1948, and his Prime Minister until 1963.
4 Ben  Gurion,  who  arrived  in  Palestine  with  the  Second  Aliya  in  1906,  witnessed  the
successive  aliyot and understood very well  the huge differences  between the various
immigrants: Russian, socialists, Polish, capitalists, German-speaking in the thirties, Shoah
refugees, Jews from Yemen and Iraq, Jews from North Africa in the Fifties. The central
idea of Ben-Gurion’s political thought, which we call in Hebrew mamlakhtiut, or Statism,
was that there was a tremendous importance in blending all these people into a single
nation and making them “Israelis”. But how do you do that? 
5 The main idea of Ben-Gurion and the Mapai leadership was to forge this artificial unity by
inventing  national  myths  and  national  symbols,  which  would  be  common to  all  the
immigrants and, time passing, would give them, and even more their children and grand-
children, the impression that they belong to one people, the Israeli nation.
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6 By the way, this is not specific to Zionism. Every nation has its political myths. A political
myth is a story which is taught and repeated every day, again and again, a story which
gradually becomes common sense, and that every citizen shares with the others. It should
of course be a positive tale, a tale which makes ordinary men extremely proud to be
members of the national collective, and which create tight bonds between the members
of the collective. Concerning France, my country of origin, I don’t need to mention the
myth of the baptism of Clovis, or the myth of Jeanne d’Arc, or the French Revolution, or
in modern times the myth of the Front Populaire in 1936, or the powerful myth of the
French  Resistance  against  the  Nazis  during  World  War II.  To  be  truly  powerful  and
effective,  a political  myth has to be based on a certain amount of historical truth. It
cannot be totally invented. There is always some reality behind it. Clovis, Jeanne d’Arc,
Robespierre,  Leon  Blum  and  de  Gaulle  really  existed.  But  every  historical  event,  to
become a political myth, has to be arranged, changed, corrected, distorted in such a way
that it will be truly useful. For example, you have to emphasize the humanistic ideals of
1789 and play down the period of Robespierre’s terror, you have to transform the poor
and tiny Resistance into a huge movement which encompassed the whole population of
France at the call of de Gaulle, etc… Let’s add that the proportions of historical truth and
of falsification are, of course, very different in various political myths.
7 From  the  beginning,  Ben-Gurion  and  other  Zionist  leaders  understood  the  utmost
importance of elaborating nation – building myths. I will give two examples, which are
very-well known. The first is Massada. As you maybe know, the story of Massada, the
story of these Zealots who leaved besieged Jerusalem and resisted the Romans in their
citadel on the top of the Rock on the shore of the Dead Sea, has no place whatsoever in
the Jewish religious tradition. It appears only in Yosefus Flavius and was never considered
by rabbinic authorities as a “positive” story of heroism, on the contrary the fact that the
defenders committed a collective suicide in order not to be taken by the Romans alive,
was considered as  extremely negative,  as  every suicide for  the Jewish Tradition.  But
Zionist  leaders  understood  very  well  the  extraordinary  potential  of  this  story  and
transformed it in a myth of Jewish heroism, emphasizing the connection between the
bravery of Massada’s defenders and the courage of young Israeli  soldiers,  who would
swear fidelity to the State on a Bible and a rifle on the top of Massada. Another powerful
myth was the legend of Trumpeldor who defended the fortified farm of Tel-Hay in Upper
Galilee  in  the  Twenties  against  Arab  attackers,  and  died  in  a  most  heroic  way,
pronouncing four words (in Hebrew) which are known by heart by every pupil in Israel:
“Tov lamout bead artsenou”; “It is good to die for our country”. Everyone knows today that
the story of Tel-Hay was largely invented and that Trumpeldor never said these words.
8 Massada and Tel Hay are not the only nation-building Israeli  myths.  There are many
others.  The  secular  leaders  of  Israel  picked  various  stories  in  the  Jewish  religious
tradition, like the story of the Maccabee revolt against the Greeks (Hanouca), the exodus
from Egypt (Pessah), or the story of the Jewish revolt under Mordechai against Aman
(Purim) and converted them into national myths of secular modern heroism, just like the
Uprising of the Varsaw ghetto in 1943. These stories were taught in schools and youth
movements,  they appeared again and again in every media, newspapers,  books, radio
broadcasts and television programs, they became the core of Zionist and Israeli teachings
and beliefs. It should also be noted that the first Minister of Public Education of the State
of Israel was a long-time colleague and supporter of Ben-Gurion in the Mapai Party, and
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himself an important historian at the Hebrew University, Professor Ben-Zion Di Nur, and
that he was personally in charge of diffusing this ideologically-oriented mythology.
9 During the first years of the State, and even until the Fifties and the Sixties, at the time of
Mapai’s supremacy, no one even dared putting into question what was considered as
absolute historical truth and as the basic Zionist credo.
10 But from 1948 on, appeared a new myth, a fundamental political myth which occupied a
central  place  within  the  Israeli  political  culture:  the  glorious  story  of  the  War  of
Independence, 1948-1949. The Israeli victory in this war, a victory of a very small armed
force against a coalition of all Arab armies, a victory which permitted the State of Israel
to survive, was in fact extraordinary brilliant. It reinforced the unity of the nation, gave
Tsahal  a  tremendous  place  in  the  hearts  of  the  citizens,  offered  a  great  number  of
national symbols and memories, but… it included also a lot of – let’s say – “problematic”
aspects. Mainly the fact that during that war, from the end of 1947 to 1949, hundreds of
thousands of Palestinian Arabs which lived for many years in this country abandoned
their homes, flew away or were flown away, never came back, and became refugees in the
Arab countries and elsewhere, an exodus which the Arabs call the Nakba, the disaster. In
other words, everyone understands that the State of Israel was built on the ruins of the
Arab  presence  in  Palestine,  and  that  the  Jewish  State  exists  precisely  thanks  to the
Palestinian tragedy, something which was probably unavoidable,  but would appear to
many people in the world as unjust, illegitimate, and immoral. Moreover, it was very
well-known that there had been cases of atrocities during the war, such as the famous
case of Deir Yassin in the outskirts of Jerusalem, where a commando of the Irgoun Tsvai
Leumi killed a great number of unarmed civilians.  This moral problem appeared very
early in the Israeli literature, as in the famous novel of Sameh’ Izhar “Hirbet Izee” or later
on in “Facing the Forests” of Abraham Yehoshua.
11 The  Israeli  leadership,  the  government,  the  Knesset,  Tsahal,  the  universities,  the
education system had to find a satisfactory explanation for this tragedy, an explanation
which would preserve the purity of the Zionist dream, the cleanliness of the war and of
the newborn Jewish State.  So a central theory appeared immediately,  during the war
itself, and it became something like an axiom in the following years. The theory had to
establish without any doubt that we, Israelis, had no responsibility whatsoever in the
Palestinian disaster. According to this narrative, Arab leaders had repeatedly called in
their radio broadcasts the Arab inhabitants of Palestine to quit their homes and take
shelter on the other side of the border, in the Arab countries, because very soon the Arab
armies would enter into Palestine, kill all the Jews in a terrible bloodshed and throw their
bodies to the sea. After victory, and the destruction of the Jewish presence in Palestine,
they could quietly return to their homes,  and continue their happy life in a country
without  Zionism  and  without  the  Jews.  Supporting  this  call  with  enthusiasm,  the
Palestinian Arabs left their homes and flew away, thinking they would come back a few
weeks later. Of course, unfortunately for them, the Jewish forces succeeded, the Arabs
were completely defeated and the refugees would never come back. 
12 Such a canonic narrative put the total responsibility of the Nakba on the Arabs themselves
and on the Palestinians, and justified, in the eyes of most Israelis, the constant refusal of
every Israeli government to take any blame for this tragedy, and the decision to refuse to
take back even a limited number of the refugees. This theory was of course reinforced by
the  arrival  in  Israel  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Jewish  immigrants  from the  Arab
countries, where they had to abandon their homes and all their belongings, and some
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equivalence was made in Israeli minds between their exile and suffering, and the exile
and suffering of the Palestinians: if there was suffering on both sides, it was OK.
13 This narrative was not only accepted as accurate during forty years, taught by teachers in
the school system and diffused by every youth movement and every media, but in fact no
one  dared  to  put  it  into  question.  It  became  something  like  a  “sacred  tale”  which
guaranteed the purity and legitimacy of the State. 
14 Suddenly, some years after the beginning of the first Lebanon war launched by Begin and
Sharon, and the tragedy of Sabra and Shatila, a deep moral trauma for the Israelis, in the
second half of the 1980’s appeared this extraordinary phenomenon, which is called “The
New Historians of Israel”. Why? I think there were many reasons.
15 The first and main reason for this phenomenon was the Yom Kippur War in 1973, which
began as a disaster for Tsahal and for the whole country, and put the State of Israel at risk
of destruction. In the aftermath of the war, the Israeli population was in a state of total
shock and of extreme anger. It discovered that the whole leadership of the country had
lied when it affirmed that Tsahal was ready to face any attack and that, anyway, the Arab
countries would never dare to attack Israel. Such a terrible anger and deception led, a few
years later, to the fall of the Labor Party and the victory of the Likud. But above all, the
Israeli  public began to change his mind and to ask questions concerning all  kinds of
heroic stories of the past which were considered as sacred and untouchable. Because, if
the  leadership  had  lied  concerning  this  war,  it  could  have  lied  concerning  other
fundamental truths commonly accepted until then. So a lot of people said: let’s check our
history.
16 Secondly, the prestige of the army was badly hurt by the 1973 surprise attack and even if
at the end Israel did win, the generals, and the officers in general lost very much of their
standing and reputation. Again, in 1982, the Begin-Sharon War in Lebanon did not appear
as a tremendous military success. Tsahal was no more sacred, so looking at the behavior
of Tsahal during the War of Independence was no more a taboo. “After all, if this bunch of
generals has been so incompetent in the Yom Kippur War and in the Lebanon war, let’s
have a look at what the Israeli army did in 1948!”
17 A third element was the gradual opening of new sources of information concerning the
War of Independence. After 1948, the Israeli leadership had carefully decided to close the
archives for many years, under the pretext of “Security of the State”. But slowly slowly,
every year, new archives were open and access was, even if reluctantly, given to young
Israeli researchers. In England, but also in France and the US, archives which had not
been seriously scrutinized attracted Israeli researchers who began to explore them very
thoroughly.
18 I would add the fact that Israel, at the end of the eighties, was already a forty years old
State, not a new country of the Third World. It was no more in real danger, it had the
strongest army in the Middle East, a strong police, a strong economy, so… the well-known
Israeli warning: “Be careful, caution, we are weak, we are in a state of danger, the Arabs
want to kill us, so be quiet, don’t publish thinks which could harm the security of the
State, etc…” such a warning began to be obsolete and irrelevant.
19 Finally, in our five Israeli universities, Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, Beersheba, Haifa and Bar-Ilan,
appeared  a  new  generation  of  first-rate  young  social  scientists,  historians,
anthropologists, economists, etc., which took their professional work very seriously and
decided not to surrender to any ideological constraints, from the right as from the left. 
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20 The first, and most famous of these “New historians”, as he called himself, was Benny
Morris. Morris was born in Kibbutz Ein HaHoresh, the son of immigrants from England.
His  father,  Ya’akov Morris,  was an Israeli  diplomat.  His  parents  left  the kibbutz and
moved to Jerusalem when Morris was a child. He was raised bilingually. He served in
Tsahal as a paratrooper during the Six Days War, was wounded in 1969 by an Egyptian
shell at the Suez Canal, and was released from the army four months later. He completed
his studies in history at the Hebrew University and received a doctorate in Anglo-German
relations from the University of Cambridge. After graduation, he returned to Jerusalem
and worked as a correspondent for the Jerusalem Post for twelve years. In 1982, he was a
field reporter during the Lebanon War, and also served as a reservist, taking part in the
siege of Beirut in a mortar unit. In 1988, when he was called up for reserve duty during
the first Intifada, he refused and spent three weeks in jail. 
21 It was while working at the Jerusalem Post in the eighties that he began reading through
Israeli government archives, at first looking at the history of the Palmach, the elite unit
of  the  Hagana,  then  turning  his  attention  to  the  origins  of  the  Palestinian  refugee
problem.  He  found  evidence  that  there  had  been  a  lot  of  expulsions  and  atrocities
committed by Jewish soldiers, which he made public in 1988 in a major book: The Birth of
the  Palestinian Refugee  Problem,  1947-1949.  In this  book,  Morris  argues that  the 700,000
Palestinians  who fled their  homes left  mostly  due to  Israeli  military attacks,  fear  of
impending attacks,  and expulsions.  He says that  there was no “centralized expulsion
policy” as such, no general plan of transfer, but that expulsions were ordered ad hoc by
the Israeli high command as needed. At the same time, Benny Morris documents many
atrocities  committed  by  Israeli  soldiers,  including  cases  of  rape  and  torture.  Morris
describes, in chilling detail, massacres that included the arbitrary killing of hundreds of
innocents and orderly executions carried out against a wall or next to a well. The book
also draws a map of 228 “empty” Palestinian villages, and attempts to explain, in each
case, why the Arab villagers left. In some cases the inhabitants were expelled by the IDF;
in others, residents fled because they learned of attacks on other villages; and in a few
others, they left under instructions of the mukhtars, the local Arab authorities. 
22 Six years later, in 1994, Benny Morris published a new book, as important as the first one:
1948 and After:  Israel  and the  Palestinians,  a  collection of  essays  on the  Palestinian
exodus of 1948 and subsequent events. It analyses Mapai and Mapam policies during the
exodus, the IDF report of July 1948 on its causes, and some new cases of expulsions that
occurred in the fifties.
23 Although Morris dismisses again and again the Arab claim that the Palestinians were
systematically expelled due to orders of the Israeli leadership, he nevertheless quotes an
IDF Intelligence Report that concludes that 70% of the exodus was caused by Israeli forces
and Jewish militias. Totally destroying the official Zionist narrative, Morris states that
“the IDF reports makes no mention of any blanket order issued over Arab radio stations
or through other means, to the Palestinians to evacuate their homes and villages”. He
proves what had been argued elsewhere, notably by Oxford professor Avi Shlaim, another
Israeli new historian, that the myth of the Arab commanders calling Palestinians to flee is
unsustainable and without any substance.
24 As soon as their first books were published, Morris, Shlaim and the other New Historians
were harshly criticized by Israeli right and Zionist left intellectuals, accused of being anti-
Semites and  “Arab  lovers”,  and  were  even  compared  to  Holocaust  deniers.  A  huge
historical  and  intellectual  controversy  developed  for  months  and  even  for  years,  a
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tremendous amount of articles were published in all main Israeli newspapers, supporting
or attacking the New Historians.  Notwithstanding the very high esteem he earned in
academic circles  out  of  Israel,  Benny Morris  was fired by the Jerusalem Post and was
unable, at that time, to get an academic appointment in any Israeli university. In 1996, he
told a journalist that he was thinking of moving to America to find some work. Only years
later, he was appointed a professor in Middle East History at Ben-Gurion University of the
Negev.
25 In the eyes of most Israelis, somebody who documents Jewish atrocities in the War of
Independence or any other Israeli-Arab War, is necessarily an “anti-Zionist” or worse, a
“post-Zionist”, an enemy of himself, of his people and of his own country. The harshest
critics of Morris, like the important writer Aharon Megged, alleged that Morris’s first
book betrayed his deep pro-Arab sympathies, and they said that his scholar work was
totally biased because of his “political commitment” against Israel. In the Arab world,
even if most intellectuals criticized Morris’ book for failing to find evidence of a
centralized  Zionist  plot  to  evict  the  Palestinians,  they  congratulated  him for  having
revealed Jewish atrocities, and they looked at him in a very positive way, as a friend, as an
ally.
26 At that point, it seemed that the phenomenon of the New Historians was linked to their
“leftist” political commitment. Because, as their research destroys the founding myths
which gave Israel  its legitimacy,  such as the heroism and moral purity of the Jewish
soldiers, it seemed that every New Historian was identified with leftist positions and was
critical of Tsahal, of Israel and of Zionism. Of course, the presence of self-declared anti-
Zionists  like  Professor  Ilan  Pappe  from Haifa  University  among  the  New Historians,
reinforced this popular conviction. Pappe himself directed a very controversial PhD at
Haifa University, establishing many cases of atrocities committed by the Alexandroni unit
of the Hagana, and after having called for an embargo on Israeli universities, he left Haifa
University and Israel.
27 But very soon, this consideration of the New Historians as a group of leftists appeared as
untrue. First, there have been rightist New Historians, for example Professor Uri Milstein,
who  criticized  in  a  very  destructive  way  Mapai’s  military  narrative  of  the  War  of
Independence. Milstein, who had published in 1973 a military history of the early days of
Israeli  statehood,  In  Blood  And  Fire  Yehuda, published  in  1989  the  first  volume of  an
important series on the War of Independence, in which he criticized flawed functioning
of Palmach and Hagana commanders, who were until then considered as heroes. He then
published Crisis and Its Conclusion, a research which criticized the functioning of the IDF in
the Yom Kippur War, and later on The Rabin File: How the Myth Was Inflated, a very negative
analysis of Yitzhak Rabin as a commander of the Palmach. Finally, in The Blood Libel of Deir
Yassin – The Black Book, he claims that the Deir Yassin massacre was a myth invented by
the Israeli left to prevent the Irgun from forming an independent unit inside Tsahal and
keep Menahem Begin out of the first national unity government. Another example of
“New History” coming from the right was the criticism of the official narrative of the
uprising of the Warsaw ghetto in 1943, a major Israeli myth of heroism, because this
narrative presented the revolt as having been entirely done by the Zionist-socialists of
the ghetto, without any help of rightist ideological groups. As historians linked with the
Israeli right pointed out, besides the Zionist-socialists like Mordehay Anielewicz and his
friends there were many revisionist pro-Jabotinsky nationalists in the leadership of the
revolt, as well as religious or even ultra-orthodox fighters. So, criticism of the official
The New Historians of Israel and their Political Involvement
Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, 23 | 2012
6
narrative promoted by the establishment was not,  and is  not necessarily reserved to
leftist historians. 
28 Then came a  huge surprise.  The foremost  new historian Benny Morris  answered his
critics that they had completely failed to understand his book on the Palestinian exodus.
They assumed that, when a serious and dedicated historian describes Jewish actions in
1948 as acts of  violence,  he necessarily condemns them and supports the Palestinian
cause. In fact, he said, not only he never condemned these actions, but from his own
Zionist point of view, he supports them – in the context of 1948. This support, he repeats,
did not stop him and should not stop any serious scholar from wanting to describe these
atrocities. He said he only did his job as a professional historian. 
29 Benny  Morris’  political  views  hardened  in  2000,  after  Arafat’s  rejection  of  Barak’s
proposals at Camp David and the beginning of the second Intifada. Later on he confessed:
“My turning point began after 2000. I wasn’t a great optimist even before that. True, I
always voted Labor or Meretz or the Israeli left and in 1988 I refused to serve in the
territories and was jailed for it, but I always doubted the intentions of the Palestinians.
The  events  of  Camp  David  and  what  followed  in  their  wake  turned  the  doubt  into
certainty. When the Palestinians rejected the proposal of [Prime Minister Ehud] Barak in
July  2000  and  the  Clinton  proposals  in  December  2000,  I  understood  that  they  are
unwilling to accept the two-state solution. They want it all: Lod and Acre and Jaffa…” 
30 Morris  still  described  himself  as  left-wing because  of  his  support  for  the  two-state
solution, but he said, “I don’t see the suicide bombings as isolated acts. They express the
deep will of the Palestinian people. That is what the majority of the Palestinians want.”
And in an interview that totally upset and threw into confusion his former admirers, he
said that Israel was justified in uprooting the Palestinian “fifth column”, once the Arabs
had attacked the infant state, and that the number executed or massacred – some 800,
was “peanuts” compared with the massacres in Bosnia in the 1990s. He even added: “The
Israeli Arabs are a time bomb. Their slide into complete Palestinization has made them an
emissary of  the enemy that  is  among us.  They are a  potential  fifth column.  In both
demographic and security terms they are liable to undermine the state. So that if Israel
again finds itself in a situation of existential threat, as in 1948, it may be forced to act as it
did then. If we are attacked by Egypt (after an Islamist revolution in Cairo) and by Syria,
and chemical and biological missiles slam into our cities, and at the same time Israeli
Palestinians attack us from behind, I can see an expulsion situation. It could happen. If the
threat to Israel is existential, expulsion will be justified...” And when a puzzled Haaretz
interviewer called the 1948 Palestinian exodus “ethnic cleansing”, Morris responded that
“there are circumstances in history that justify ethnic cleansing. I know that this term is
completely negative in the discourse of the 21st century, but when the choice is between
ethnic  cleansing  and  genocide  –  the  annihilation  of  your  people  – I  prefer  ethnic
cleansing.” Morris’ comments concerning the Palestinian expulsions in 1948 have also
proved controversial in an interview with the Israeli newspaper Haaretz in 2004 when he
said:
31 “If  Ben Gurion was already engaged in the expulsion,  maybe he should have done a
completed job. I know that this stuns the Arabs and the liberals and the politically-correct
types. But my feeling is that this place would be quieter and know less suffering if the
matter had been resolved once and for all. It may yet turn out this was his fatal mistake. If
he had carried out a full expulsion – rather than a partial expulsion – he would have
stabilized the state of Israel for generations.”
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32 Let’s say that for us, Israeli historians and intellectuals, Professor Benny Morris remains
an enigma.
33 In conclusion, I would like to ask: what has been the real place of this phenomenon, the
“New  Historians”,  in  contemporary  Israeli  society?  I  wonder  if  their  extraordinary
scholar work of rethinking the past and of destroying Zionist political myths has had
consequences in the Israeli public sphere.
34 Today, I firmly believe that Benny Morris’s work, and New Historians books in general,
have had a serious impact on Israeli political thinking. Before these publications, most
Israelis  were  absolutely  not  ready  to  acknowledge  any  responsibility  for  the  1948
Palestinian tragedy and for the Palestinian problem. After the publication of these books,
a lot  of  people in my country began to understand that we do have a responsibility
because we did destroyed the Arab civilization which existed in Palestine, and because
our soldiers  did commit expulsions and atrocities.  Of  course,  most  of  us  continue to
believe that this tragedy was probably unavoidable, because the Arab world, and all the
Palestinians, totally and absolutely refused any idea of dividing Palestine, and because, if
they had remained in their villages and in their homes, no Jewish state could have been
established. But I do believe that the New Historians really contributed to promoting and
strengthening the idea of the two-state solution. Four years only after the publication of
Morris’ fundamental work, Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres came to power, and in 1993
the Oslo agreements were signed, which potentially included the birth of a Palestinian
state alongside Israel, with an emerging support of Israeli public opinion.
35 I  always  wondered  if  Rousseau’s  Contrat  Social truly  influenced  Robespierre  and  the
leaders of French Revolution, but the New Historians of Israel are really a case in which
academic and intellectual writings influenced, even if slightly, the way of thinking in my
country.
ABSTRACTS
At  the  end  of  the  1980’s,  appeared  in  Israel  a  remarkable  and  fascinating  intellectual
phenomenon:  the “New Historians”.  Young social  scientists,  working in the fields  of  history,
sociology, anthropology and economics, began to put into question fundamental ideas which,
until  then, had been considered by the Israeli  society as perfect “truth”.  In particular,  these
young and brilliant  academics undertook to review various chapters  of  contemporary Israeli
history, in order to check if these events were true or were “political myths” created by the
Zionist  establishment  to  support  the  national  aim.  The  main  debate  was  initiated  by  Benny
Morris  and  dealt  with  the  exodus  of  the Palestinian  Arab  population  during  the  War  of
Independence  (1948-49).  The  book  written  by  Morris  and  published  in  1988  was  the  first
revolutionary event in this national controversy. The questions raised by the “New Historians”
provoked  a  major  intellectual  debate  in  Israeli  media.  These  young  academics  were  harshly
criticized, or enthusiastically supported. The aim of my paper is to try to explain the importance
of this controversy in the context of the Israeli  society,  in the wake of my book: La Nouvelle
histoire d’Israël : essai sur une identité nationale (Gallimard). 
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À la fin des années 80, un phénomène remarquable et fascinant apparaît en Israël :  celui des
“nouveaux historiens”. De jeunes scientifiques, travaillant dans les domaines de l’histoire, de la
sociologie, de l’anthropologie et de l’économie, remettent en question des idées fondamentales
qui, jusque-là, étaient considérées par la société israélienne comme l’unique “vérité”. Ces jeunes
et  brillants  universitaires  ont  entrepris  d’examiner  différents  chapitres  de  l’histoire
contemporaine israélienne, afin de vérifier si ces événements étaient réels ou bien des “mythes
politiques”  créés  par  l’establishment  sioniste  dans  le  but  de  soutenir  l’objectif  national.  Le
principal  débat  a  été  lancé  par  Benny  Morris  qui  traitait  de  l’exode  de  la  population  arabe
palestinienne pendant la guerre d’Indépendance (1948-49). Le livre de Morris publié en 1988 est
le premier événement révolutionnaire dans cette controverse nationale. Les questions soulevées
par  les  “nouveaux  historiens”  ont  provoqué  de  grands  débats  intellectuels  dans  les  médias
israéliens.  Ces  jeunes  universitaires  ont  été  sévèrement  critiqués,  ou  soutenus  avec
enthousiasme. Le but de mon article est de tenter d’expliquer l’importance de cette controverse
dans le contexte de la société israélienne, à la suite de mon livre: La Nouvelle histoire d’Israël : essai
sur une identité nationale (Gallimard).
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